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Will Peace Bring Justice to Colombia? 
LAUREN CARASIK 
September 7, 2016 
After more than half a century of war, Colombia stands poised to usher in peace. The 
internal armed conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the government, the longest in the hemisphere, has claimed more than two hundred 
thousand lives, disappeared tens of thousands, and internally displaced nearly seven 
million people. Some eight million Colombians are registered on a list of victims, and 
nearly every Colombian was affected in some way. The peace accord between the 
warring parties, announced by government and insurgent leaders on August 24, will be 
put to a popular vote on October 2. Many observers express optimism that peace is 
finally at hand. But the nation is deeply polarized about the brokered agreement, and its 
fate is uncertain. If the accord passes, the work of building a just and sustainable peace 
has only begun. 
The four-year negotiation process centered on five main pillars: rural reform; political 
participation; cease-fire, demobilization, and reintegration of the insurgents; 
transitional justice and reparations for the victims; and drug trafficking. The 297-page 
agreement also outlines methods of implementation. Many Colombians, though war-
weary, object to the concessions that incentivized the FARC to agree to lay down its 
arms: the guerrilla group is deeply unpopular. As is the current administration, one 
must add. Many fear that President Juan Manuel Santos’s unpopularity, rather than a 
rejection of the accord’s merits, will sink the referendum. 
Among the accord’s most contested provisions are those related to transitional justice, 
which will allow combatants to avoid jail time in exchange for full and honest 
participation in a truth and reconciliation process. Opponents of the deal, led by former 
president Álvaro Uribe (whose father was killed by FARC in a botched kidnapping), have 
blasted the agreement, claiming it confers impunity for grave crimes. “To this terrorist 
group, they also give impunity, and political legitimacy to all its actors, including those 
responsible for massacres [and] the most severe offenses, and crimes against 
humanity,” he said. President Santos, who staked his reputation on the process, 
bristled at the notion that the agreement enshrines impunity. “The most responsible 
[for] crimes against humanity will be investigated, judged, and condemned,” he said. 
“But they will be condemned in a transitional justice, which is the justice that the world 
has created to allow armed conflicts to reach peace. And that’s what we are applying.” 
To end the conflict and facilitate lasting reconciliation, Colombia developed an 
innovative framework that prioritizes restorative justice, rejecting retributive justice as 
ill suited for a society transitioning from five decades of civil war. The model seeks to 
promote dialogue and healing over revenge, and arose from the historic decision to give 
victims a key place at the negotiating table. Delegates to the peace talks included victims 
and representatives from historically marginalized populations, including women and 
Afro-Colombians, as well as indigenous and LGBTQ groups—in other words, those who 
have suffered most in the war. Among the provisions for the victims are the creation of a 
specialized search unit for those who disappeared during the conflict, a Truth 
Commission, and reparations for those most affected by the conflict, which will take the 
form, in part, of rural development initiatives. 
Instead of adjudication of crimes in court, a peace tribunal will preside over “political 
crimes.” Combatants who provide full and truthful confessions will be pardoned and 
reintegrated into civilian society. For more serious crimes, including extrajudicial 
killings, torture, forced displacement, and sexual violence, a separate unit will handle 
the charges. Those who confess to grave crimes will not be imprisoned, but instead 
subjected to alternative sanctions that constitute an “effective restriction of liberties and 
rights, such as the freedom of residence and movement” for up to eight years. They will 
also be required to engage in reparative measures. Harsher punishment will be meted 
out only to those who refuse to confess or dissemble; those that do could faceup to 
twenty years in prison if they are found guilty of human rights abuses or war crimes. The 
accord also prohibits extradition to another country. Drug trafficking that the FARC 
engaged in to finance the conflict will fall under the rubric of political crimes to be 
handled by the peace tribunal, though crimes related to personal enrichment will not. 
Some human rights groups welcomed an end to the conflict but questioned whether the 
scheme will satisfy victims’ rights to truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition. 
Likewise, they expressed doubt about whether the strictures of the accords meet 
Colombia’s obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish violations of international 
law. “As it stands, the victims’ agreement ensures that those most responsible for these 
atrocities will escape genuine justice by allowing people who confess their crimes to 
avoid any remotely serious form of punishment,” Human Rights Watch said in a 
statement. The organization wrote that the agreement contains “ambiguities and 
loopholes” that could allow perpetrators to evade the sanctions imposed on 
them. Amnesty International also expressed concerns, saying in a statement that 
many of the crimes were unrelated to the political underpinnings of the conflict. “Many 
of these human rights violations and abuses have not occurred in the context of direct 
combat between the security forces and guerrilla groups. Instead, many have been 
motivated by economic factors linked to the exploitation of lands occupied by 
Indigenous people and Afro-descendent and peasant farmer communities,” the rights 
group said. The organization also warned of a serious risk that those crimes will persist 
after the accord is implemented. 
Like other international observers, International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda praised the conclusion of the negotiations. The ICC had been 
watching developments in Colombia closely since initiating a preliminary examination 
of the country’s transitional justice mechanisms more than a decade ago. “The 
paramount importance of genuine accountability—which by definition includes effective 
punishment—in nurturing a sustainable peace cannot be overstated,” the chief 
prosecutor said. While reiterating Colombia’s obligations to respect international law, 
Bensouda seemed to signal satisfaction with the compromise struck by the parties, 
saying she noted, “with satisfaction, that the final text of the peace agreement excludes 
amnesties and pardons for crimes against humanity and war crimes under the Rome 
Statute.” 
The compromise on political participation is also unpalatable to many Colombians who 
oppose legitimizing the rebel group. The FARC, which took up arms to confront 
egregious conditions of economic and social injustice, will be granted a legislative voice 
“without a vote” through nonvoting representation in the legislature through 2018, and 
will be guaranteed 5 seats in the 106-member senate and 5 in the 166-member lower 
chamber over the next 2 election cycles. The government also agreed to create 12 
congressional districts in remote rural areas that have been historically 
underrepresented. 
Like all transitioning societies, Colombia faces a complicated calculus in striking the 
balance between peace and justice. Neither side prevailed in all its demands but both 
believe the accord is the best hope to move past the bloodshed and confront and 
dismantle the structural factors that gave rise to it. Next month, the country’s war-weary 
citizenry will decide whether an imperfect peace is better than no peace at all. 
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